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A.: Labor Law--Federal Pre-Emption in the Field of Labor Relations

CASE COMMENTS
lished that the federal constitution does not extend the right to
counsel beyond the trial stage into the area preceding the preliminary hearing. Larkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 96 A.2d 246 (1958);
Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 486, 104 N.E.2d 153 (1952);
State v. Murphy, supra; State v. Grillo, supra; State v. Tune, supra;
Commonwealth v. Agoston, supra; Commonwealth v. Bryant, supra.
It is submitted that as long as the Court can not find an absence
of "that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justic&'
confessions obtained while the defendant is without the assistance of
counsel, as in the principal case, will be acceptable as evidence. Perhaps efforts should be made to improve the crime detection system to
a point where the type of interrogation suggested in the dissenting
opinion would not be necessary and the arguments contained in this
article supporting the denial of counsel theory would be without
foundation.
G. D. G.
LABOR LAw-FEDmiAL PRE-EImToN uN THE FiN) OF LABoR RE-

brought an action against D in a circuit court of Alabama
alleging malicious interference with his lawful occupation. D, a
union, of which P was not a member, called a strike, and in the
course of picketing refused to allow F, an employee, by threats of
bodily harm and damage to his personal property, to enter the plant.
P sought to recover for loss of earnings, mental anguish, and punitive
damages. D filed a plea to the jurisdiction of the court on the basis
that the National Labor Relations Board, by virtue of the TaftHartley Act, had exclusive jurisdiction. The trial court sustained
P's demurrer to that plea; the case went to trial and P obtained
judgment for $10,000. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed
both the circuit cQurt's jurisdiction and the judgment. On certiorari
the Supreme Court, held, that the award of compensatory and punitive damages was valid and the fact that both the National Labor
Relations Board and the state court had concurrent jurisdiction in
awarding back pay did not create a conflict of remedies. UAW-CIO
v. Russell, 78 Sup. Ct. 932 (1958).
LAToNS.-P

The principal case raises the question of federal pre-emption
and how readily it is to be inferred, particularly in the field of labor
relations. The first principal congressional legislation in this field
was the National Labor Relations Act of 1985, 46 STAT. 499 (1935),
26 U.S.C. § 151 (1946), which created the National Labor Relations
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Board and gave to it exclusive jurisdiction in the field of certification,
collective bargaining and employer unfair labor practices, and left to
the states control over the activities of employees and the labor unions insofar as the state's action did not conflict with the Board's jurisdiction. Allen Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942). The Board's jurisdiction was extended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. 36 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1958), to include certain named unfair laboi
practices on the part of labor organizations. The act also designated
certain rights of both employers and employees.
Assuming that Congress could, by virtue of the commerce and
supremacy clauses, exclude all state action in the field of labor relations, Cox & Seidman, Federalismand the Law of Labor Relations,
64 H-,uv. L REv. 211 (1950), to what extent did the passage of these
two congressional acts pre-empt the field of labor relations?
Prior to Garner v. Teamsters Union, Local 776, 846 U.S. 485
(1953), the Supreme Court decisions in the field of labor relations
limited the doctrine of federal pre-emption not to obsolute pre-emption of the entire field because of congressional occupancy, but rather
to situations in which there was a direct conflict of state and federal
legislation, International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949); see Note, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 468 (1952).
In the Wisconsin case, supra, the Supreme Court held that the states
were not excluded from regulations that were not controlled by federal legislation.
However, in the Garnercase, supra, the Supreme Court held, in
effect, that Congress by the creation of the NLRB had entered the
field of labor relations and that the Board had exclusive jurisdiction
over the entire field of labor relations whether there was a remedy
for the particular wrong or not. This decision seems to stand for the
principle of a general federal pre-emption by entry into the field
rather than the direct conflict theory which prevailed in the earlier
cases.

The statement of the rule in the Garnercase, supra, seems too
broadly stated in view of the prior decisions hereinbefore discussed,
and the subsequent decisions, particularly United Construction
Workers v. Laburnum ConstructionCorp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), and
the principal case. In the Laburnum case, supra, the Virginia court
had held the defendant union guilty of the tort of interference with
contractual relations. United Const. Workers v. Laburnum Const.
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Corp., 194 Va. 872,75 S.E.2d 694 (1953). On certiorari the Supreme
Court held that the state had jurisdiction to try the tort action even
though the same tortious act did, under the LMRA, constitute an unfair labor practice. The court proceeded on the theory that, since
the LMRA did not provide a remedy for the consequences of such
tortious conduct, it was still within the power of the state to award
such relief.
In the principal case the court held that although the Board, if
the respondent had applied to it, could have awarded him back pay,
the fact that the state would also make such an award in a tort action
would not cause a conflict of remedies.
It would seem then that in the principal case the Court could
have held, under the Garner case, that the power of the state to
award back pay in a tort action had been pre-empted since Congress
had given the Board the power, in its discretion to likewise make
such an award. However, the Court chose not to so hold, perhaps
because the awarding of back pay does not constitute full tort relief
in most cases of this nature, thereby indicating that Congress did not
intend for the Board to have jurisdiction in the tort aspect of labor
relations. In any case, it follows that by the outcome of the Russell
and Laburnum cases, supra, the Supreme Court is supporting preemption by direct conflict rather than pre-emption by entry into
the field.
It is felt that Congress could regulate even the tort phase of
labor relations under the commerce clause as hereinbefore stated;
however, the Board thus far has been given no jurisdiction in this
aspect of the field. It would seem in accord with the majority of
prior opinions concerning labor relations that until Congress legislates
in the tort realm of labor relations, the states will continue to have
jurisdiction although the act constituting the tort may also consist
of an unfair labor practice under the LMRA of 1947.
G. H. A.

PERSONAL PROPERTY-GUrS-INFo rAL WmnNGS AS CoNsTrrUrSuFFrCmcn DELIvERY.-Defendant wrote several letters to the
plaintiff, his former wife, in which he referred to certain bonds as
"your bonds". He also stated that he would draw the interest on
these bonds. Defendant had access to the bonds after the alleged
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